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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Ares I Avionics and Software Chief Engineer and the Avionics Integration and Vehicle
Systems Test Work Breakdown Structure CWB51 Manager in the Vehicle Integration Office were
issued a joint action by the Ares Project Control Board IPCBl to develop the leanest set of prac-
tices for design· manufacturing' installation· and testing of electrical cable harnesses- The action was
driven by a disagreement between the Ares I-X programmatic and technical communities regarding
testing of electrical harnesses after they had been installed on the vehicle- The testing' which was
advocated by the technical community' was eventually rescoped to a subset of the Ares I-X harnesses
per the recommendation of the Ares I-X Mission Management Office and the decision of the Con-
stellation Program Manager- An approach of how to close the action was developed and approved
by the Ares PCB on May 19. 2009_ The method chosen was a study of historical practices· lessons
learned from Ares I-X. and benchmarking of commercial and other relevant industries-
Historically· post-installation cable harness testing has been used since the Apollo program
via engineering drawing callouts· circa 1964_ For the Space Shuttle· the tests began with a require-
ment in the Johnson Space Center IJSO Design and Procedural Standard JPR-8080. JSC Design
and Procedural Standard Requirement E-14. which has evolved to the current NASA-STD-8739.4.
"Crimping' Interconnecting Cables· Harnesses· and Wiring'" most recently dated November 24. 2009_
For the Shuttle Program the orbiter and propulsion elements are subject to post-installation testing-
For expendable launch vehicles· one major contractor performs the tests and the other does not-
For Ares I-X· the reason post-installation testing became an issue was because it was unplanned
land therefore unsequencedl work in the integration and checkout of the vehicle- Originally'
post-installation testing was a requirement on the project· but the requirement was subsequently
removed- This requirement was removed prior to the Critical Design Review ICDR> to make it
consistent with the processes used on the Atlas V This requirement was relieved on the avionics
Integrated Product Team qPTl but not on the other IPTs- This meant that the ordering of long-
lead parts such as mating connectors and the development of test procedures did not occur- Adding
the requirement back late in the development life cycle would have had a significant impact to the
Ares I-X launch date-
For this assessment· benchmarking was accomplished by developing a survey and performing
either a site visit or mail-in response through the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAEl Subcom-
mittee AE-8A· Electrical Wiring Systems Installation· a group whose focus is on aerospace wiring
installation issues- Responses were received from government and private sector launch vehicle devel-
opers· military and commercial aircraft· spacecraft developers· and harness vendors- Results varied
widely' as demonstrated in appendix A; however· the crewed launch vehicles and military aircraft
consistently perform the post-installation tests'
iii
---------------------------------- -
Key findings were that the existing test requirements do identify manufacturing- and instal-
lation-induced damage- While the number of failures discovered by post-installation testing may be
statistically insignificant- the fact is that the discovery of even one failure in a Criticality 1 circuit
justifies retaining the requirement for human-rated vehicles- The team found no data supporting the
claim that post-installation testing damages the harness insulation system When properly planned
in the production floW' there is relatively low overhead associated with the testing-
The recommendation is for the Ares projects to retain the value-added practice of
postiabrication and post-installation cable harness testing- including insulation resistance qRl and
dielectric withstanding voltage (DWV> tests- Human factors should be emphasized in harness design
including ease of access- harness routing- interfacing structures- and routing near obstructions in an
effort to eliminate the manipulation required to install and test these harnesses· To ensure the low-
est life-cycle cost- several preparation steps should be taken- These steps include ensuring that the
electrical integration deliverables to NASA <harness diagrams and wiring tables> are in an electronic
format compatible with commercial automated test equipment and ensuring that the production
contractor is required to produce and deliver cable mating adapters- NASA should also ensure that
proper test and verification requirements are in place to ensure that the production and operations
contractors derive the proper work instructions and workflows'
The authorization- signature page- and team memberships for the original Ares Cable
Harness Post-Installation Testing Report document are presented in Appendix B-
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TECHNICAL PUBLICATION
EVALUATION OF CABLE HARNESS
POST-INSTALLATION TESTING: PART B
1. INTRODUCTION
The Ares Project Control Board (PCB) issued an action to develop the leanest set of prac-
tices for design· manufacturing· installation· and testing of electrical cable harnesses· To address the
action item· a plan was developed that consisted of a review of historical practices· lessons learned
from Ares l-X and benchmarking of commercial and other relevant industries· From this informa-
tion· Findings and Observations were documented· and Recommendations for the design and opera-
tion of the crew launch vehicle were developed and presented for consideration by the Ares PCB.
2. ASSESSMENT PLAN
A plan was developed by Chris Iannello and Mark King and was endorsed by the Harness
Team members· The assessment method chosen was a study of historical practices- lessons learned
from Ares ,-x. and benchmarking of commercial and other relevant industries· The original plan is
shown in figure 1.
Note: Due to time constraints- many of the sites originally planned for benchmarking
were not visited· A mail-in survey was used to collect additional information' Appendices A and C
contain some of the responses of the mail-in surveys·
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Figure 1. Closure plan.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION AND APPROACH
3.1 Action Description
3.1.1 Action From Ares Project
In light of the recent issues on Ares I'X related to cable11arness installation and testing' Ares
must develop its own lean approach to the manufacture· installation· test· and checkout of cables!
harnesses across the integrated launch vehicle stack- The team must assess the Ares I'X for on'going
lessons being learned· conduct an endto'end assessment (cable manufacture to flight) of current
cable11arness practices and standards in NASA and the commercial launch industry and any other
relevant industries- and develop a recommended set of practices for Ares that will result in the lowest
Iife'cycle cost with a high reliability approach· The goal should be to develop the leanest set of prac-
tices for Ares designers· assemblers· and operators to use in laying out· manufacturing' installing'
and testing cableS'harnesses for Ares I and V rather than relying on NASA-STD'8739.4. The team
should include project· engineering' Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MAl, original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs)· and operators'
3.2 Action Approach
In order to complete this action' the team decomposed the action given into several smaller
and more manageable activities that are listed below Beneath each item the team has listed the
activities performed to address this portion of the action· Actions taken to assess lessons learned
from Ares I'X are as follows:
• Assess lessons learned from Ares IX
- Interviewed participants, collected lessons learned, and assessed testing regime during site visit-
• Conduct an assessment of cable11arness practices in NASA· commercial launch industry· and
other relevant industries·
- Performed benchmarking site visits of NASA and commercial space industry' surveyed broader
industries' and interviewed SAE subcommittee with wide cross section of industrial
participants'
• Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACN
• Develop a recommended set of practices for Ares I and V resulting in a balance of lowest life'cycle
cost with high reliability'
- Provided as findings· observations· recommendations· and lessons learned in the subsequent
report-
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• Integrate these practices in Ares I and V design· manufacturing· assemblyt1nstallation· test· and
operations-
- Implementation of recommendations by Ares Elements-
The activities are further described below-
3.2.1 Ares I-X Assessment
The team reviewed Ares I-X summary reports related to the issues with post-installation cable
testing- In addition' Mike Bangham a team member on this assessment· was an active participant
representing the Ares I-X project during the team's assessment of the testing- Ares I-X summa-
ries and their proposed lessons learned with respect to cable testing are included in the appendices-
Experience from Ares I-X points to the need to consider this kind of posbnstallation testing during
design and during productiorvintegration flow planning- In particular· with regard to design· Ares
I-X suggests design rules to avoid installation-induced problems· effectively designing for operations
(j-e-' How can the cable and harness designs best accommodate operations?)- In addition· I-X points
to the need for a reevaluation of how harnesses are routed- The team points out that consideration
for how to develop a test to avoid damage is also an important step-
3.2.2 Benchmarking Activities
The Ares project action included the action to ".. .conduct an end-to-end assessment (cable
manufacture to flight) of current cablEYharness practices and standards in NASA and the commer-
cial launch industry and any other relevant industries..." To accomplish this· the team used several
methods to benchmark other's activities with respect to cable testing- These included the following:
Benchmarking field facility visits-
Emailed surveys-
Open discussiorvinterviews with technical committees on pertinent standards-
To further expand on the team's benchmarking activities' the team visited several facilities
including the United Launch Alliance (ULA) facility producing Delta Ilt1V (and future home of
Atlas) in Decatur· AL; a prominent commercial space contractor's production facility; Shuttle's Wire
and Test Facility (Kennedy Space Center (KS(l. FLJ; and the Interplanetary Rover Cable Facilities
(Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)· Pasadena· CA)- For facilities that the team was unable to visit due
to time or access constraints· an emailed survey was used- In total· although relatively few emailed
responses were received on the survey «'0). those responses offered an interesting and pertinent
cross section of the aircraft manufacturers and added a new perspective to the dataset In addition
to these activities· the members of the SAE Subcommittee AE-8A were also interviewed at their
Portland· OR meeting in October 2009_ Participants in the SAE AE-8A committee included OEMs·
airframe manufacturers· airline and other aircraft operators' systems suppliers· the military' NASA·
government agencies (e-g-' the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA»· component manufacturers·
consulting firms· and academia- The participants represented a diverse cross section of industries
and· hence· perspectives on posbnstallation cable testing varied-
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3.2.3 Problem Reporting and Corrective Action and Significant Problem Searches
PRACA and significant problem searches were conducted (see Appendix DJ· In addition to
the original planned actions, the PCB also requested lAres PCB 80, Oct 2009) that the team collect
known failures and determine if the testing in question would be capable of screening for such fail-
ures· To that end, three main data collection activities ensued· The first was a collection of significant
wiring related anomalies in NASA history that resulted in a list of high-profile failures attributed
to wire latent defects or induced damage to wire by handling' Second, previously compiled studies
of Orbiter Wiring Problem Reports were reviewed and pertinent data were excerpted for this report
Finally, the Ares Avionics and Software Chief Safety Officer (CSO) commissioned a data collec-
tion activity in order to find any instances where the post-installation cable testing was able to catch
failures with the potential for a critical failure (j'e" loss of life or loss of mission)'
3.3 Background and Status of Current Requirements
3.3.1 Background
Document searches using the NASA Standards and Technical Assistant Research Tool
(STARr found that the earliest reference to post-installation requirements for harnesses is in JSC
Design and Procedural Standard 133, dated July 27, 1970, cited in National Space Transportation
System INSTSl 08080-1, Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards· The Space Shuttle Program
released a similar document' JSC Manual IJCMJ 8080 on April 01, 1991, which has evolved into JSC
Procedural Requirements (JPR) 8080.5, JSC Design and Procedural Standards· The applicable test
requirement is found in Standard Number E-14, dated April Ol, 1991, and reaffirmed on March 08,
2005.
The earliest Agency-wide document citing post-installation requirements for harnesses is May
1996 in NASA Handbook INHBJ 5300.4(3G-1J, Workmanship Standard for Interconnecting Cables'
Harnesses' and Wiring' paragraph 3G140l.8. This document has evolved into NASA-STD-8739.4,
where the post-installation test requirement is in paragraph 18.2.8 and was reaffirmed in the latest
release dated November 24, 2009.
Post-installation tests were imposed on the Apollo via engineering drawings dated circa 1964.
Various military standards had requirements for testing' but the responsibility for document
ing specifications for the types and frequencies of tests was assigned to the individual programs·
3.3.2 Current Status
Per NASA Policy Directive INPDJ 8730.5, NASA Quality Assurance Program Policy, NASA-
STD-8739.4 (Change 4) is the current workmanship standard that is to be imposed on programs
fabricating space flight or mission critical ground support cables and harnesses· NASA-STD-8739.4
is maintained by the NASA Workmanship Technical Committee INWTO
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A separate task of the NWTC is to support NASA's responsibility to comply with Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119. This Circular directs government agencies to use
voluntary consensus standards lVCSSl in lieu of government-unique standards except where incon-
sistent with law or otherwise impractical· To meet that goal· the NWTC participates in several orga-
nizations that maintain VCSs'
For electronics fabrication· the predominant VCS organization is the Institute of Printed Cir
cuits qpCl. Association Connecting Electronics Industries· IPCWire Harness Manufacturer's Asso-
ciation (WHMAl A-62°A· Requirements and Acceptance for Cable and Wire Harness Assemblies
is considered the primary industry standard for cables and harnesses· Along with many electronics
manufacturing companies (many of which are large NASA and Department of Defense suppli-
ers)· the NWTC supports the committee that maintains this standard and a subcommittee that is
generating IPC A-62°AS· Space Applications Hardware Addendum to IPCWHMA A-620A The
scope of the space addendum is to "provide additional requirements over those published in IPC!
WHMA A-62°A to ensure the performance of cable and wire harness assemblies that must survive
the vibration and thermal cyclic environments getting to and operating in space'" The NWTC plans
to recommend Agency adoption of this document to replace NASA-STD-8739.4 upon the release
of the space addendum and its associated training program- This is expected to occur before the end
of calendar year 2010.
The electrical test requirements in IPCWHMA A-62°A require post-installation tests of
cable and harness assemblies· It is not expected that the space addendum subcommittee will change
that requirement for the space addendum-
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4. DATA ANALYSIS
The results of the benchmarking activities described above are summarized to the entries
listed in table 1. Company names are generalized to their respective industries to protect proprietary
contractor data'
The columns represent different industries and are generally the result of a single representa-
tive respondent in order to maintain the. intent of this chart to provide a summary of the benchmark-
ing activity' The rows represent electrical tests grouped by productiorvfnstallation phase· Specifically,
after the harness is manufactured, the postfabrication testing occurs after a supplier or a respon-
dent's in-house fabrication facility fabricates the cable· Preinstallation at system integration refers to
the process by which a subset of respondents assemble all the electronics (avionics) and operation
harnesses as a preliminary testing opportunity before final installation into the structure/chassis'
Finally' the post-installation rows refer to testing after the cable harness is fully integrated in the
vehicle or structure' Tests across the rows include the testing required by NASA-STD-8739.4, which
includes continuity' DWV, IR' and other pertinent testing such as functional tests or safe-to-mate
testing' In some cases, these other pertinent tests are listed because the respondent cited them as
alternatives that mitigate or lessen the need for a NASA-STD-8739.4 test not being performed' As
an example, the safeto-mate test, a test performed by JPL as a channelization test, also verifies
expected electrical parameters done as a precursor to mate' Notes on the bottom of the table explain
key aspects of the data· Note 1refers to interview responses from cable engineering at JPL and their
concern that DWV testing has the potential to cause latent damage to the cable system As a result·
JPL intentionally does no DWV testing' It should be noted that studies performed by the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSF(l and KSC on the effects of DWV show no adverse effects on the insu-
lation systems (see Appendix El. Notes 3and 4speak to the relatively new practice of cable testing
and cable test facilities at the commercial space contractor' This vendor is just getting up to speed
on how to incorporate the full test regime required by NASA-STD-8739.4 but· at the time of the
team's visit, had not done so· Notes 5 and 6refer to the team's initial contact with the Orion project
on the NASA and contractor sides· The initial response was that Orion would follow the policy of
no post-installation IR or DWV once avionics are installed· However' this response was revised by
NASA engineering supporting the Orion Project' who will hold the contractor to their contractual
requirement to perform such testing'
The Orion project documentation calls for post"installation DWV in CEVT<l31212 CEV
Subsystem Requirements Specification Crew Module and Service Module'Spacecraft Adapter
Wiring Subsystem under WIRE·0684 (jncluded as Appendix Fl·
Data collection on this activity began by evaluating NASA's own experience on wiring
anomalies and practice of postinstallation cable testing within its major programs·
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co Table 1. Benchmarking result.
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A first step was a review of the databases and anomaly logs of the major manned programs
including the Shuttle's PRACA Database· KSC's Shuttle Problem Report Tallies- and a review of
significant wiring anomalies in the Shuttle and Apollo'
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the number of wire problem reports (PRs) per year
and flights per year· Note that the flight rate data are erroneously shifted to the right one year· From
the data· there is no indication that wiring PRs decrease with vehicle maturity in the case of the
Orbiter (although Ares' single-use- ship-and-shoot strategy makes this not directly comparable to
Ares)' Also- per the Orbiter electrical team there are two major reasons that Orbiter wiring PRs
increase during low flight-rate years· First- inspections of wiring go up during those years· Second· as
the flight rate decreases- there is more traffic in the ship resulting in an increase in collateral damage'
Number of Problem Reports on Orbiter Wiring from 1979 to 2007
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Figure 2. Shuttle (Orbiter) wiring problem reports and flight rate from 1979-2000.
Figure 3 shows a breakdown of the types of wire-related problems encountered in the Orbiter
fleet· Note that some of the most significant categories include damaged conductor and exposed
conductor·
Clearly- handling-induced damage or damage resulting from work in close proximity is a pri-
mary source of wiring anomalies· The question is: Of the total set of wiring problems- how many-
if any- can the post-installation testing in question screen? To answer this question- the team took
a different approach on data collection· The idea was to generate a very narrow search criteria with
the intent of finding instances where the post-installation testing described in this report uncovered
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Figure 3. Orbiter wiring problem breakdown.
failures that' had they gone unnoticed, had the potential to result in a critical effect· To this end, a
keyword search was generated on the MSFC Shuttle PRACA Reportable database on keywords
"POST" "INSTALLATION," "DWV," "IR" "MEGGER" "HI-POT" and "CONTINUITY"
The results were further screened to ensure all the resulting entries were, in fact' instances where
post-installation testing caught a potential problem- PRACA search results for the MSF05huttle
are presented in table 2.
The 11 entries found suggest that this sort of testing does uncover potential issues' but the
number of entries suggest that these types of significant finds are rare· In fact' each survey and inter
view respondent indicated uncovered failure rates of less than 1-2%
As such, the team's conclusion here was even though IR and DWV usually uncover a low
failure rate (often less than 1%), the data presented herein show cable testing of this sort does iden-
tify cable damage that could result in loss of life or loss of mission' albeit rare, and that data alone is
sufficient justification to conduct this testing'
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Table 2. MSFClShuttle PRACA search results.
MSFC Functional Hardware Test
Report. Problem Title Element System Criticality Criticality Operation Fail Mode Cause FMEA' Fail Date NCAPart.
A16814 0.1. CABLE X21W5R PIN A(switch 51) failed SRB E&l 1R - A EL UK 50-04-X21/B05 3/25/1996 10400-00SO-501
DIINtest.
A17039 IW20 harness failed megger check post test SSME Harnesses 1R 1R D EL ETE H120-o1 2f7/1997 R0018420-51
904297.
A17040 IW16 harness failed megger check post test SSME Harnesses 1R 1R D EL ETE H116-o1 2f7/1997 RS008116-101
904297.
A17271 Wire harness failed post-installation DIIN ET Electrical 1R 1 A EL ES 3.12.7.2 4/25/1998 80931003714-229
test.
A17395 AFT SRB/orbiter wire harness (303W04) ET Electrical 1R - A EL M 3.12.4.2 4/20/1999 80931003714-160
failed dielectric withstand voltage (1,500) test.
A17537 Wire harness (303W07) failed post-installation ET Electrical 1R - A EL MM 3.12.7.2 12120/1999 80931003714-229
TM04 dielectric withstand voltage (1,500 V)
test.
A17616 Wire harness 303W07 did not pass TM04 ET Electrical 1R 1 A EL MAW 3.12.7.2 9/14/2000 80931003714-179
dielectric withstand voltage test (1 ,SOO V) at
MAF.
A17632 FASCOS Cable FID/ln-family. SSME Harnesses 3 3 Q Mf ET H150-o1 11/1/2000 R0014030-201
A18030 Harness failed continuity check. SSME Harnesses 1R 1 Q EN DHA H102-o1 2f7/2005 RS0081 02-041
A18080 BIPOD WEB ternperature sensor harness ET Electrical 3 3 AI EL MW 3.8.14.2 4/27/2005 80931023704-099
311W09P1 failed post-installation isolation
resistance test.
A18544 THE 303W01 wire harness failed the ET Electrical 1R 1R AS EL MW 3.12.1.2 7/16/2008 80931003714-209
post~nstallation TM04 dielectric withstand
voltage (1 ,SOO V) test on ET-129 at MAF.
....------------------------------------
The team also wanted to understand what strategies could be employed to reduce the over
head associated with these tests' To that end· the team referred to Ares I-X lessons learned· the
returned surveys· and the interview responses to questions related to testing overhead·
Ares I-X lessons learned are included in Appendix G· These lessons can be summarized as
follows:
Risk to your avionics when doing DWV
Design for accessibility'
Preplan for testing'
On Ares I-X. the lessons learned underscore design for accessibility and preplanning for
postinstallation testing' On the Ares I-X solid rocket booster (SRB) (first stage) structure' harness
failures· in general· have occurred in the last 12 inches or so of the harness· The team makes the
following two observations on this:
First· most manipulation to install these harnesses occurs near the end·
Second· many of the installations have the smallest bend radii at the box connection point
On testing the harnesses· the requirement is that the harnesses be tested after installation· So
when does installation end? The team maintains that it ends when the harnesses are either installed
at the end plate or very near it Today on the SRB program testers must take the harness end and
bend it to allow connection to the test harness· In some cases· the harness is then completely out
of the installation area· This is done very carefully and the harness is supported (usually by ropes)·
but there is manipulation of the harness to get it into a test configuration and then back into the
installation configuration'
In figure 4. the harnesses are draped over the cylinder to allow the technicians to connect to
the harness· Given most of the failures have occurred in the last 12 inches· and those last 12 inches
are being manipulated after the test· in addition to when the cables are finally mated· this design is
not optimal with respect to cable testing'
Suggestions for improvement include improving the ways tests are set up and performed from
a design perspective' These include the following:
Selecting easily matedldemated connectors'
Designing for special test connectors that allow technicians to leave the harness in the near final
location for testing'
Considering a common connector'
Developing a common method to hold the test connectors and harness in place during the testing
process'
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Figure 4. Ares I-X cable harness test configuration.
The team concurred with all of the Ares I-X lessons learned· Lessons learned are incorpo-
rated in section 5. Findings· Observations· and Recommendations (FOR)· with the exception of the
first concern related to performing OWV testing with avionics installed (cables/connectors dematedl.
Even though OWV testing of harnesses requires disconnecting them from their associated
avionics boxes pretest· Ares I-X brought forward a concern that modern avionics should be assessed
against possible damage when cables under OWV test fault to chassis' The question raised was that
projects should ensure that the avionics box can withstand any variations in its chassis voltage should
a harness under test short to the chassis nearby· The team did not share this Ares I-X concern for a
number of reasons· First· with proper bonding and grounding it is virtually impossible to develop
any potential difference across the avionics box chassis' Further· modern test equipment is designed
to protect the device under test to the greatest extent possible' This includes current limiting features
and incremental voltage test regimes- It is likely that these are the reasons the team could find no
documented cases of testing-induced damage-
With regard to the survey and interview responses' in all cases where the vendor was perform-
ing testing comparable to the postinstallation testing in NASA-STO-8739.4, each vendor indicated
that such testing was low overhead· In each of these cases' it was noteworthy that these organizations
had well-developed test procedures- The wire harness pin outs were in an electronic format consum-
able by their particular brand of cable tester; they had racks of cable adapters for each flight or
vehicle harness suitable for interconnect with the tester' and the test was planned into the assembly
workflow so as to minimize effort- These responses were developed into the recommendations found
in section 5.3.
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Finally' it should be noted that a number of high-profile failures in NASA history have listed
wiring faults and handling-induced damage as related causes· Included in these are the Apollo 1
and Apollo 13 incidents and a number of Shuttle anomalies· The Apollo 1 fire shown in figure 5 (as
excerpted from The Apollo 204 Report) occurred during a full-up launch simulation on January 28,
1967. A momentary increase in alternating current (AC) Bus 2 voltage on all three phases was noted
at ::::;9 seconds before the report of fire, and at the same time telemetry data from equipment powered
from AC Bus 2 showed abnormalities· All communications were lost 18 seconds later· The rapid
spread of fire within the pure oxygen atmosphere caused an increase in pressure and temperature
that resulted in rupture of the Command Module and creation of a toxic atmosphere· Death of the
crew was from asphyxia due to inhalation of toxic gases due to fire·
Figure 5. Apollo I fire (crew, capsule, and damage).
Listed in the Apollo 1 findings was that it is most probable that the fire was initiated by an
electric arc and was most probably brought about by some minor malfunction or failure of equip-
ment or wire insulation· Components of the Environmental Control System installed in Command
Module 012 had a history of many removals and of technical difficulties that included regulator
failures· line failures· and environmental control unit failures· The design and installation features of
the environmental control unit made removal or repair difficult· In addition' deficiencies in design·
manufacture· installation, rework· and quality control existed in the Teflon~ electrical wiring· The
report conclusion included a recommendation that rigid inspection at all stages of wiring design,
manufacture' and installation be enforced·
Similarly' on Apollo 13 (fig· 6). as excerpted from the Apollo 13 Review Board Cortright
Commission's report· the No· 2 oxygen tank had been previously installed in the service module
of Apollo 10. but was removed for modification (and was damaged in the process of removap· At
55 hours' 55 minutes. oxygen tank No· 2 exploded· causing No· 1 tank also to fail· The Apollo 13 com-
mand module's normal supply of electricity, light· and water was lost· at a distance of 200,000 miles
from Earth· Subsequent investigation of the accident determined the cause of the combustion was
most probably the ignition of Teflon wire insulation on the fan motors' wires· caused by electric arcs
in this wiring· In both cases· handling-induced damage and wire insulation failure were contributors·
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Figure 6. Apollo 13.
Other examples of notable failures within the Space Shuttle Program are depicted in figures 7
through 10. Figure 7shows damage to Orbiter wiring caused by work in close proximity to the wire
bundle shown· Note that the outer color coating is damaged in several areas' exposing the Kapton lil
insulation layer' Also note that in several areas' the outer Kapton layer has also been damaged· This
type of damage can exist undetected with no outward indication that the system function can be
compromised· In these cases· ascent thermal ancVor vibration environments can move the harness·
increasing the potential for bare conductor to short to chassis or other exposed wires· Figures 8and
9show a closeup of the insulation damage and figure 10 shows a closeup of the teleprinter short
During Space Transportation System (STSl-28. a short circuit occurred between the +28V
and return wire segments inside a power cable for a teleprinter (fig' 10). Suspect Cause: Kapton wir
ing was subjected to a severe bend over the top of the straight backshell when routed during use· The
design was changed to incorporate the use ofTeflon wiring and a 90-degree backshell·
During STS-93. an electrical short circuit on AC Bus-1 (AC11. Phase-A (fig' 11). resulted in
loss of the primary controller for Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSMEH and the secondary controller
for SSME-3. The suspected cause was that a torque set screw head with burred edges likely damaged
the wire insulation before launch· resulting in the exposed conductor· which made contact during the
vibration environment of launch· resulting in the short
Another anomaly occurred during STS-97 that· after postflight analysis· drove a rollback of
STS-98 for assessment The anomaly was that System "A" NASA Standard Initiator (NSP Pressure
Cartridge in the left aft lower strut did not fire· resulting in a Criticality lR failure of the SRB separa-
tion system shown in figures 12 and 13. The assessment team confirmed that the Orbiter and exter-
nal tank (E"P cabling performed nominally as did the pyrotechnic NSI· The failure was attributed
to the watertight reusable strut ordnance cable· Gross shield damage was noted· The most probable
cause was identified as handling damage unique to the ET attach-ring strut reusable strut cables·
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Figure 7. Orbiter wiring damage.
Figure 8. Closeup of Orbiter wiring damage.
Figure 9. Closeup of Orbiter wiring damage.
Exposed Conductor with1
Evidence of Arching
r.....od ConducIlIr
Figure 10. Closeup of Orbiter teleprinter short. Figure 11. STS-93 AC Bus short to structure.
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Figure 12. 5T5-97 N51 cable failure.
5T5-97 IFA Cable Investigation
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Figure 13. 5T5-97 failure location.
Technicians performed x'ray inspection and electrical tests of the STS-98 reusable strut ord-
nance cables and replaced one suspect upper strut reusable ordnance cable and also reterminated
one suspect lower strut reusable ordnance cable· The team replaced one suspect forward separation
bolt ordnance cable' An effort was also kicked off to perform x-ray inspections and electrical tests of
additional cables from inventory' The x-ray inspection and electrical tests of 223 flight cables from
inventory was completed and four cables were identified with a break in a conductor· Analyses con-
cluded conductor breaks were not recent occurrences· Corrective actions were implemented for the
STS-98 mission· which entailed rollback to the Vehicle Assembly Building 'VAB) for inspection and
testing of system tunnel cables· The team completed x-ray inspections and electrical tests of 36 of the
38 system tunnel cables with no anomalies noted· This anomaly shows the impact that problems like
these can have when discovered late in the floW"
4.1 Ares I First Stage Concept of Operations
The first stage will actually be integrated as a stage in the KSC VAB· similar to how the
Space Shuttle SRBs are stacked today' The KSC contractor' working under Constellation Program's
Ground Operations Project· will develop the assembly and checkout procedures from the information
provided by the Ares I first stage' This information is in the form of Test &Verification Requirements
Operations lTVROs)· which are being developed for the first stage CDR Presently' the heritage
Shuttle SRB and Ares I-X are being used as a starting point forTVRO development·
4.2 Ares I Upper Stage Concept of Operations
The upper stage will be fully integrated and checked out at the Michoud Assembly Facility
(MAP before shipment to KSC In the current concept of operations production flow the instru-
ment unit structure is handed over from the upper stage production (USpl contractor to the instru-
ment unit assembly qUAl contractor for integration and checkout, and then the IUA is handed
back to the USP for integration onto the rest of the upper stage' The upper stage manufacturing and
assembly subsystem team is responsible for overall stage integration'
The USP contractor is responsible for development of the in-process work instructions· which
contain the details of how the stage is assembled and checked out- The prime driver to the work
instructions is the upper stage assembly drawings'
Work instruction development has begun for a ground vibration test article, but this test
article does not need the full suite of flight unit work instructions· Per the master schedule· no instru-
ment unit work instructions are being developed· Once development begins· the NASA Design
Team (NOT! will be responsible for ensuring that the appropriate Ares I requirements and processes
are captured,
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4.3 Shuttle Concept of Operations
Shuttle production flow differs for each of the three elements· For Orbiter' although com-
plete post-installation cable testing was performed after all harness installations, it is rarely repeated
onboard the Orbiter after individual wiring anomalies are identified· For the SRB and ET since each
are built up each flow- a number of post-installation cable tests are performed· For the ET these tests
are performed at MAF as each cable is installed into the ET For the SRB, since the segments are
integrated in the VAB and system tunnel cables installed there' a post-installation test is performed
byKSC
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5. FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Findings
The following team findings were identified:
F-l. Data show that the testing regime required by existing Ares cable harness testing require-
ments is capable of identifying typical cable system manufacturing defects and installation-induced
damage'
F-2. In NASA programs· the number of failures identified by harness testing is relatively low in both
the build and installation processes'
F-3. The incidence of testing-induced failures is extremely low
F-4. The Ares I-X production flow was designed without the requirement for post-installation
cable testing and· as a result· did not account for all the necessary preplanning to facilitate
post-installation cable testing' which is the root cause of the issues on Ares I-X with respect to cable
testing-
F-5- NASA programs that do incorporate the full suite of NASA-STD-8739.4 required testing dem-
onstrate a value-added step in their production flow with relatively low overhead associated with the
testing-
F-6. The effort to perform cable testing is strongly a function test preparation including the for-
mulation of cable pin-out tables· the compatibility of the electronic format of these tables with the
automated tester' and the availability of tester mating adapter cables·
5.2 Team Observations
The following team observations were identified:
0-1. There is a perception within some NASA programs and program contractors that high-voltage
cable testing can result in damage to the cable's insulation system but this assertion is not supported
by MSFC and KSC testing' which show no measureable adverse effects-
0-2. The degree to which NASA programs follow NASA-STD-8739.4 varies when it comes to cable
testing and· in particular· post-installation cable testing-
0-3- Cable testing practices vary in NASA programs and in industry based on a number of factors
that include the reliability required in the application, the maturity of the operation· the nature of
the assembly process' and the cultural heritage of the workforce-
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5.3 Recommendations
The following team recommendations were identified:
R-t The Ares project should retain the value-added practice of postfabrication and post"installation
cable testing including IR testing and DWV testing·
R-2. The Ares project should emphasize human factors in cable harness design including redesigning
the harness routing' interfacing structures' routing near obstructions' etc' in an effort to eliminate the
manipulation required to install these harnesses·
R-3. The Ares project should ensure the lowest life-cycle cost to implement recurring cable testing by
incorporating the following necessary preparation steps into the production contractor's workflow:
Ensure the electrical integration deliverables to NASA from the production contractor include
harness diagrams and wiring tables in an electronic format compatible with commercial auto-
mated cable testers (such as Cirrus)'
Ensure the production contractor is required to produce and deliver cable mating adapt-
ers suitable for interconnecting each Ares cable harness to the automated cable tester for
postfabrication and post-installation testing'
The selection of the cable tester's mating connector, which makes up one end of each and every
adapter cable' should be chosen such that it is standard, easily obtainable' of necessary contact
density, and consistently employed on each adapter cable·
Ensure documentation that initiates the creation of post-installation test procedures is adequately
addressed during workflow development
Ensure the assembly sequence accounts for planned post-installation cable testing' This is
particularly true for areas with difficult access·
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6. ALTERNATE VIEWPOINTS
The review team offered no dissenting opinions· The team is in concurrence with all findings-
observations- and recommendations·
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7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A Science and Technology Technical Interchange Meeting criMI pdf is found in Appendix H
and the NASA Electrical Presentation Final Ares PCB Presentation is presented in Appendix I·
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APPENDIX A-SURVEY RESPONSE SUMMARY/INTERPRETATION MATRIX
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor-
mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NASA Technical Reports Server
(NTR$l using <http:?htrs·nasa·gov/searchjsp>·
26
APPENDIX B-STUDY AUTHORIZATIONS AND TEAM MEMBERS
8.1 Approval and Document Revision History
Table 3. Approval and document revision history.
Version Description of Revision Author Effective Date
1.0 Initial Release Mark S. King,
Chris Iannello
8.2 Authorization and Notification
This report was generated as the result of an action item assigned by the Ares Project Man-
ager at the March 24. 2009. Ares Project Control Board <PCB)· Authorization for the action closure
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listed as team members· supported the activity extensively by providing consultation services· facili-
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AND ASSESSMENT OF ARES AVIONICS AND SOFTWARE
CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor-
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APPENDIX E-ELECTRICAL HARNESS TEST DATA
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this TP- Infor-
mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http;f'htrs-nasa-gov/
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APPENDIX F-ORION PROJECT REQUIREMENT EXCERPT
ON POST-I NSTALLATION CABLE TESTI NG
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor
mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <httpuihtrs"nasa"gov/
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APPENDIX G-ARES I-X PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED
ON POST-INSTALLATION CABLE TESTING
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this TP- Infor
mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http;fhtrs-nasa-gov/
searchjsp>-
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APPENDIX H-SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE
MEETING NASA ELECTRICAL PRESENTATION
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor
mation needed to access Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <hUp;fhtrs·nasa'gov/
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34
APPENDIX 1-FINAL ARES PROJECT CONTROL BOARD PRESENTATION
Information for this appendix is classified SBU and can be found in Part A of this Tp· Infor
mation needed to Part A of this TP can be obtained on the NTRS using <http:fhtrs·nasa·gov/
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